银行贷款监督、政府干预与自由现金流约束——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

摘要： 银行贷款作为一种重要的公司治理工具,能够约束公司自由现金流的代理成本。以往的研究往往关注银行贷款的融资功能,较少关注银行货款的微观治理功能。本文从银行贷款监督的理论框架出发,实证检验了银行贷款监督对自由现金流代理成本的约束作用,并进一步分析了政府干预对银行贷款监督效率的影响。实证研究发现:①对于低增长的公司,企业的自由现金流量越高,代理问题越严重。②短期银行贷款和长期银行贷款都能约束自由现金流量的代理成本,但短期银行贷款的监督作用更强。③进一步考虑政府的信贷干预,我们发现,在政府干预较弱的地区,短期银行贷款的监督作用更加显著。本文的研究结果表明,中国上市公司存在严重的自由现金流代理成本问题,银行贷款能约束自由现金流的代理成本,但银行贷款自身的特征和制度环境决定了其监督效应的局限性。为进一步发挥银行大贷款人的监督作用并降低自由现金流的代理成本,应对上市公司进行分类治理、加强银行业竞争,降低政府对银行的信贷干预。
Bank loan is an important corporate governance tool which can constrain the agency costs of free cash flow.Previous studies tend to focus on the financing function of the bank loan,less concerned about the bank’s micro-governance function.This article tests the bank loan’s supervision role on the agency costs of free cash flow from the theoretical framework,further analyze the impact of government intervention on bank loan’s supervision efficiency.The empirical study has found that: ①For low growth companies,the higher the free cash flow is,the more serious the agency problem will be;② Short-term bank loans and long-term bank loans can inhibit the agency cost of free cash flow,but the supervision of short-term bank loans has stronger effect;③ Further considering the intervention of government,we have found that the supervision of short-term bank loans will have more obvious effect in districts where government puts less intervention.The result of the research shows that there is serious agency cost of the free cash flow in China and bank loans can inhibit the agency cost of free cash flow.However,the characteristics of bank loan and the system environment limit its supervision.In order to give full play to the supervision of banks’ big lenders effect and reduce the agency cost of free cash flow,we should classify listed companies to manage,increase the bank industry competition,and reduce the intervention of government on bank credit. ...

科技文献银行贷款;;监督;;自由现金流量;;代理成本