“救命稻草”到“金融瘟疫”的跷跷板——中小企业联保贷款的案例与演化博弈分析

摘要： 2012年始,我国长三角地区中小企业联保贷款违约的传染被人称为一场"金融瘟疫"。但联保贷款的融资方式亦曾被中小企业视为"救命稻草",这种转变缘何而来?今后的中小企业联保贷款又何去何从?本文基于对上海钢铁贸易行业的联保贷款案例分析,得出从"救命稻草"转变至"金融瘟疫"的关键因素——贷款额度、内部惩罚和外部冲击。其后,将这些因素纳入到演化博弈的分析框架中,得到联保贷款的"还款跷跷板":还款的人和不还款的人分坐在跷跷板的两端。最后,基于"还款跷跷板"给出了一些政策建议:跷跷板支点控制——增加内部惩罚和控制适度信贷规模,可以提高联保贷款抵御外部冲击的能力;改跷跷板为平衡木——为避免巨大外部冲击带来的违约传染,可解除连带责任改为信用贷款;长大了就别来玩跷跷板——联保贷款不适合长大的商户。
After 2012,the contagion of loan defaults in the middle and small business'group lending has been called a financial contagion in the Yangtze River delta.The financial mode of group lending was used to be a life-saving straw of middle and small companies.What is the future of group lending in middle and small business? In this paper,case study has been done on the group lending in Shanghai's steel trade industry.On this basis,it gets the keys of group lending which make it transfer from life-saving straw to financial contagion.Those keys are the size of the loan,the inner penalty and the outer shock.Then those factors are put into evolutionary game model.After calculation of the model,this paper finds the seesaw of repayment in the group lending.On this seesaw,the person who repay the loans and the person who do not repay the loans sit on the two ends.Based on the seesaw of repayment,this paper gives some suggestion on policies in the future.First,control the place of seesaw's pivot through increasing the inner penalty and maintaining a suitable size of loan.This way can enhance the group lending's ability of defense from outer shocks.Second,change the seesaw to balance beam.That means changing the group lending to credit loans.This way can void the contagion of defaults when there is a bigger shock.Third,do not play seesaws when you have grown up,because group lending is not suitable for big business.